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Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the nature of the ideology that is developing from new
information technologies. The basic thesis is that there is a confusion between the accumulation and
mathematical processing of “information” on the one hand and “knowledge” on the other. While
knowledge, it is argued, is always based on the world of life, as a set of problems that arise from the
materialistic, biological, emotional reproduction of a living human body, information represents the most
abstract and formal version of it, which can be accumulated and calculated, but whose true meaning
always depends on the meaning and reproductive intention of an organic-human life. Those who think of
information as knowledge without a foundation in a materialistic and non-linguistic sense, fall into the
ideology of conceiving the world as a massive information process and, consequently, of conceiving the
human mind as a calculating machinic structure similar to the way a computer works. In this perspective,
the essay, taking up the fundamental intuitions expressed by Gramsci in Americanism and Fordism,
analyzes the origin of the term “Technology” in Marx's Capital, its distinction of meaning from the term
“Technique” and the likely influence exercised in this field on the Marx’s thought from German
Technologie, as a fundamental teaching discipline of the 18th century German Cameralism.
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Marx, Spinoza and the New Technologies
Roberto Finelli
1. Introduction.
It is in the notes on Americanism and Fordism in Notebook 22 that
Antonio Gramsci gives rise to a new topology of the systemic
categories of his thought, comparing the new forms of American
capitalism with the economic and social organization of the old
European continent. And it is precisely from this reconfiguration
and rearrangement of the organic concepts of his thinking, with reference to the new forms of production and technology summarized
in the term “Fordism”, that it is worth starting out as an introduction
and guide to this essay which attempts to try and reflect on the new
digital technologies and the new “humanity and spirituality” that
derive from them. Americanism in Gramsci’s pages essentially
refers, as is well known, to the technological and social revolution
of Fordism, based on the one hand on mass production through
assembly lines and a Taylorist division of labour and, on the other,
on the increase in wages and consequent consumption. But above
all it refers, to move from this radical transformation of the productive structure, to a sort of totalization of capital, in the sense of
an economic structure that produces not only material goods and
class relations, but also worldviews, values, ideologies through which
human beings live their social life. In an America not burdened by
great historical and cultural traditions as in Europe,
it was relatively easy to rationalise production and labour by a skilful
combination of force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a
territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely
subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the
whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in
the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional
political and ideological intermediaries. The phenomenon of the “masses”
which so struck Romier is nothing but the form taken by this “rationalised”
society in which the “structure” dominates the superstructures more
immediately and in which the latter are also “rationalised” (simplified and
reduced in number) (Q22§2,pp. 2145-6; SPN pp. 285-6).1
1 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Q. Hoare and G. NowellSmith, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1971, pp. 285-6. The volume is available on the
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It is superfluous to remember how much in the tradition of
theoretical Marxism Gramsci dislocated the concept of ideology
from the only negative connotation of false consciousness to its
gnoseological, cognitive valorization: in the sense of interpreting
the world of ideas, worldviews, ethical and moral values, as an
indispensable medium, we could say Kantianly as a “transcendental”, to perceive, move and give meaning to reality. So much so
as to define, the Sardinian thinker, for this epistemological, and at
the same time ethical-political function, assigned to ideologies, with
the term civil society much less the complex of economic relations
and practices, as had happened in the Marxian lexicon, and much
more that sphere of political activity par excellence, as a place
where so-called private organizations (trade unions, parties,
organizations of all kinds) appear on the scene, which have as their
objective the production and confirmation of the consent or, on
the contrary, the transformation of people's ways of thinking. But,
without going into the very complex question, here what is
important to underline is that Gramsci, with this definition of
Americanism-Fordism as a social-historical field in which the
economic structure directly produces the ways and values of
generalized social conscience, has made his own - without being
sufficiently aware of them either philological or philosophical - the
lesson of the Marx of Capital, for which, with the doctrine of
fetishism, the ideological production of ideas is produced by the
same economic relations of exchange, without the need for social
actors specifically and professionally dedicated to cultural activities.
In other words, that lesson of Marxian fetishism that tells us that
the place of genesis and configuration of the ideological is not in the
superstructure, as the German Ideology and the Introduction of ’59 wanted,
but directly, and paradoxically, in the structure.
I leave it to the reader to reflect on the epochal scope, in my
opinion, of this different location of the foundation of ideology,
according to which the production of capital and, at the same time,
the production of its self-dissimilation are intrinsically linked,
specifically when capitalism reaches the most advanced
technological transformations that are most appropriate to its
nature. But what is more significant in my view is that this intrinsic
Internet with this page numbering; an alternative electronic version also exists, published by
ElecBooks (London), 1999, but with a different page numbering.
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connection, originally conceived by Gramsci, between economic
structure and ideology appears to be the most consonant introduction
to the content of the reflections that follow in this essay.
2. The “German Technology”.
In order, from a Marxist perspective, to carry out certain critical
considerations on new information technologies today I think it is
necessary to reflect briefly on the different meanings of the terms
“Technique” and “Technology”, with particular reference to the
history of the meaning of the word “Technology” (Technologie) in
German. The main hypothesis that I intend to present is in fact that
the German meaning of “Technologie”, which Marx uses above all
in Capital and in the 1863-65 Manuscripts, is profoundly different
from the meaning of the English terms Technology and Technique.2
The semantic context of the term Technologie in the context of late
eighteenth-century German culture appears marked by deeply
original characteristics. German Technologie is an academic discipline
that was born and developed as a science of administration and
politics in the German principalities. Technologie was taught in
German Universities and was part of the curriculum of the state
officials, civil servants, who had the function of managing the
growth of material wealth and production activity. Technology was a
science whose scope was to give state officials a precise knowledge of
craft and manufacturing activities, their classification, articulation
and distinction based on the different types of products, their best
location, procurement and transport network, their relationship
with agriculture and with other social and administrative areas of
the cameral (“chamber”) and police sciences. As the long title of
Johann Beckmann’s Anleitung zur Technologie says, “Technologie”
had its field of study in “knowledge of crafts, factories and
manufactures, above all those which are in closer connection with
2

The indispensable reference on all this is to the research work that Guido Frison has been
carrying out for many years now, and from whose writings I personally have drawn the
fundamental indications for the study of cameralism in German culture and society and, at the
same time, for the deepening of the semantic and conceptual distinction between the German
entries “Technologie” and “Technik”. Of Frison’s considerable production, suffice it to
mention here G. Frison: Linnaeus, Beckmann, Marx and the foundation of technology. Between natural
and social sciences: a hypothesis of an ideal type. First Part: Linnaeus and Beckmann, Cameralism,
Oeconomia and technologie, in “History and technology”, 1993, vol. 10, pp. 139-160; Second and
Third Parts, Beckmann, Marx, technology and classical economics, in “History and technology”, 1993,
vol. 10, pp. 161-173. By the same author see also Technical and technological innovation in Marx, in
“History and technology”, 1988, vol. 6, pp. 299-324.
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agriculture [Landwirtschaft], police [Polizey] and cameral science”,
where Polizey meant, approximately, government administration.
The aim of Technologie was to increase the wealth of the State and,
as such, it had as its object of knowledge much more the
classification and definition of the procedures and phases of a
production activity – starting from the nature and specific type of
the object of work – than the study of machinery and work tools.
One of its fundamental purposes was to subtract artisan know-how
from a purely empirical and practical competence and to translate it
into a precise path, into a method of rigorous knowledge, which
was not used by the craftsman but by the state bureaucrat.
It [Technologie] must not train any weaver, any beer-maker, nor in general any
craftsman (Handwerker) because to practise their art they need great ability and
dexterity which [both] have to be acquired separately through boring exercise,
but are useless abilities for those to whom I am referring (Beckmann, Anleitung
zur Technologie, Vorrede, 2nd ed. 1780).

In handicraft workshops knowledge was only of a customary
nature, according to the instructions of the master craftsman to
companions and apprentices. Instead Technologie ordered work
operations in a rigorous and systematic way, according to the view
of a social actor, who, external to the production process, was able
to direct a production that was not only efficient in itself but
coherent with the entire territory of the Prince and of the state, as
well as with the well-being of the whole population.
Technology is the science which teaches how to treat (Verarbeitung) natural
objects (Naturalien) or the knowledge of crafts (Gewerbe). Instead in the
workshops, it is only shown [that] one must follow the instructions and the
habits of the master in order to produce the commodity, [on the contrary]
technology provides in systematic order fundamental introduction[s] in finding
the means to reach this final goal on the basis of true principles and reliable
experiences, and how to explain and to utilize the phenomena which take place
during the treatment (J. Beckmann, Anleitung zur Technologie, 2nd ed., 1780: 17).

Due to its exteriority to the production processes understood in
the strict sense, Technologie therefore showed a dual nature. On the
one hand, in fact, it was a political-administrative discipline, which
participated in state power, in state authority, and on the other it
was a scientific discipline because, similarly to the natural sciences, it
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objectively described the necessary way of being and of carrying out
production processes. Both these characteristics came together in
the same goal: to separate the knowledge of doing from the doing in the
context of economic activities and to differentiate learned and
skilful men (the cameralistic bureaucrats as much as the businessmen) according to a hierarchical relationship of competences or
expertise from the executors of manufacture and crafts.
Johann Beckmann studied the methods of working the mines,
factories and foundries as well as the collections of art and natural
history, during his travels in Holland, Denmark and Sweden.
Inspired by the taxonomic work of the botanic scholar Linnaeus, he
taught “Philosophie und Technologie” at the University of
Göttingen, which had been since its foundation one of Germany's
best universities open to the modern culture of the Enlightenment.
There he lectured on political and domestic economy, and in 1768
created a botanical garden according to Linnaean principles.
Among the many works by Beckmann, those most significant for
our topic are the Anleitung zur Technologie (1777) and the Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Erfindungen (1780–1805).
What is important to consider is that his activity as a scholar of
manufacturing, craft techniques, mining and his teaching of
Technology (Technologie) as a university discipline, falls into the sociopolitical and administrative context of the era of so-called
Cameralism.
Cameralism (from the German Kammer, the prince’s treasure chamber
first, and after the prince’s council chamber,) characterized the political
and administrative theory and practice of the German principalities
during the eighteenth century and continued to influence German
state theory, especially Prussia, even during the nineteenth century.
The conception of the state in the cameralistic tradition was profoundly
different from the tradition of English liberalism. In the latter, the public
authority must essentially guarantee order, so that everyone can act
freely with his own private initiative, provided that it does not harm
the private sphere of the others. On the contrary, in the German
tradition, where the prince was also the father of his subjects, the
state had to guarantee people not only order but also happiness and
wellbeing. In this context, Technologie was a university discipline
aimed at increasing the wealth of the state and constituted the
competence, the knowledge of the cameralistic bureaucrat as regards
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his ability to direct a production process, in which the workers had
to follow the prescriptions of the competent scientist.
Moreover, understanding the function of Technologie as a
university discipline for the formation of the bureaucracy of the
German Principalities implies underlining the different vision of the
economy that distinguished the British culture and the German
culture of the second half of the 1700s. In the former, the economy
was increasingly a political economy, that is, a science that had the
market as its fundamental object as a place of socialization and
comparison between free economic players. It is a political economy
because it considers the market as the characteristic institution
through which modern civil society lives and reproduces itself, as a
social sphere distinguished from the political state. In the modern
market, the formation of prices is impersonal, each person’s action
not depending on anyone in particular, since it depends on
everyone’s economic action. For this reason, in English political
economy, the nature of economic law has a different character from
the nature of political law, based on decision and choice. Instead, in
the German culture of the late eighteenth century, economics still
has a profound link with the classical-Aristotelian meaning of
economy as oikos-nomos (administration of the house).
According to an ancient conception by which the patrimony of
the sovereign is not yet distinct from the patrimony of the state, the
Prince in the German principality was not only sovereign but also,
as said, father of his subjects. As a father (as head of the oikos) he
had the obligation and the honour to guarantee not only order but
also the well-being of his subjects-children. In this sense Technologie
was part of the more general Polizey, as having care of the whole of
the polis, that is, as management and functioning of the State with
particular reference to the well-being of the population. Nor was it
by chance that the two university chairs that were established in
1727 at the Universities of Halle and Frankfurt an der Oder are
chairs of Ökonomische-, Polizey- und Kameralwissenschaft. That is to say,
the cameralists were not so much economists, in the most modern
sense of the term, as primarily bureaucrats and political scientists, in
the historical context of the extraordinary reforming push produced
by so-called “enlightened absolutism” on the basis of the political
effects of Protestantism.
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Johann Beckmann’s Anleitung zur Technologie (1777) was the first
work that self-consciously developed the concept of technology as
a discipline devoted to the systematic description of handicrafts and
industrial arts. Beckmann sought to make Technologie into a true
knowledge (Wissenschaft) by creating a classificatory scheme
equivalent to the Linnaean system for plants and animals.
From this point of view Beckmann tried to develop through the
whole work of his life a number of overall classification frameworks
that could contain the entire complex of the manufacturing and
production processes of goods. From the raw materials and the
natural resources of agriculture handled in his Principles of German
Agriculture [Grundsätze der teutschen Landwirtschaft, 1769], through the
description of the different productive branches and its corresponding innovation process in his Guide to Technology [Anleitung zur
Technologie, 1777], to the classification in material-physical sense of
final goods in his Introduction to the Commodity Sciences [Vorbereitung zur
Waarenkunde, 1795-1800] and, finally, to the Guide to Science of Trade
[Anleitung zur Handelswissenschaft, 1789].
Nevertheless it can be emphasized that the most general
characteristic of cameralist culture was grounded in a naturalhistorical approach to knowledge and as such, focused on
classifying rather than explaining. Beckmann’s Technologie rested
indeed firmly in the tradition of Bacon’s proposal for a natural
history of trades, a project also pursued in Denis Diderot and Jean
D’Alembert’s contemporary project of the Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers. However, this scientific
tradition was included in the education processes belonging to
cameralism, as a set of practically-oriented academic disciplines
concerned with state administrative organization.
In this historical and social context, the meaning of Technologie in
the German language of the eighteenth century combined in an
inextricable way a meaning that belonged to the natural sciences and a
meaning that belonged to the social and political sciences.
3. Marx between Technology and Technique
Marx is well aware of this meaning, attributed to “Technologie” by
German cameralistic culture. In the 1861-63 Manuscripts he expli-
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citly wrote about it: “Beckmann, 1772, braucht zuerst die Bezeichnung Technologie” [Beckmann first used the denomination of Technology].3
This means that he was well aware of Technologie as a newly
established discipline, whose origin dated back to the work of
Beckmann (Anleitung zur Technologie), which Marx cites here with the
wrong year 1772, instead of 1777. As we know from the London
notebook of 1851, ten years earlier Marx had come into contact
with the German technologists, with Beckmann’s Beyträge zur
Geschichte der Erfindungen,4 with the Geschichte der Technologie of J. H.
M. Poppe, a pupil of Beckmann, and with other works by Poppe
himself. Previously Marx had approached the study of the labour
process in the manufacturing and modern factory system through
the works of A. Ure, C. Babbage and W. Schulz. With the extracts
of 1851 he widened his gaze to the history of techniques before the
industrial revolution. So testifies his letter to Engels of October 13,
1851: “just recently I have been slogging away in the library I use,
reading above all about technology and its history, and about
agronomy, to get at least some idea of this rubbish”.5 We also know
from another letter to Engels of January 28, 1863 that later,
precisely during the writing of the 1861-63 manuscript, he felt the
need to return to his technology extracts.
I am inserting certain things into the section on machinery. There are some
curious questions which I originally failed to do with. To elucidate these, I have
re-read all my note-books (extracts) on technology and am attending a practical
(only experimental) course for workers on the same by Prof. Willis (in Jermyn
Street; the Institute of Geology, where Huxley also gave his lectures).6

In my opinion it is precisely with the 1861-63 Manuscripts that
Marx starts making a distinction of meaning between the term
Technologie and the term Technik, to which I would like to draw
attention, starting from the very explicit definition of Technologie that
Marx gives with the first edition of the first book of Capital in 1867.
The principle of large industry to resolve in its constitutive elements each
production process, considered in and of itself and without taking man's hand
3

K. Marx, Manuskript 1861-1863, MEGA, II, 3.6, p. 1932.
[English translation A History of Inventions, Discoveries, and Origins, Bohn, London, 1846;
modern reprints by Kessinger , Whitefish (MT), 2010, and HardPress, Sligo 2012 – ed. note.]
5 Marx-Engels, Collected Works, 38: 476.
6 Marx-Engels, Collected Works, 41: 449; in English also in Marx-Engels (1983), Letters on Capital,
trans. A. Drummond, London, New Park, p. 82.
4
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into account, has created the most modern science of technology. The multicolored configurations of the social production process apparently devoid of
reciprocal and stereotypical connection, broke down into applications of the
natural sciences, consciously planned and systematically distributed according
to the useful effect that was intended. Technology has also discovered the few
great fundamental forms of movement in which every production action of the
human body is carried out by necessity, despite the multiplicity of the tools
used: just like mechanics that in machines there is a constant reproduction of
elementary mechanical powers, and he cannot be fooled by the maximum
complication of the machinery.7

In this definition it seems to me that Marx welcomes the basic
inspiration of the cameralistic Technologie as objective knowledge of
the production processes, borrowed from the precision and
objectivity of the natural sciences. In this objectivistic reduction of
Technologie there is no space or relevance for any autonomous
agency of human action.
But at the same time Marx extends the meaning of Technologie, or
to put it better, concentrates it on a production process also
understood as a work process, the size of which had remained
extraneous to German technologists. Technologie for Marx does not
only concern, as he will say in other places, “the application of
machinery, and in general the transformation of production
processes into the conscious application of natural science,
mechanics, chemistry etc., for certain purposes (die Anwendung der
Maschinerie, und überhaupt die Verwandlung der Productionsprocsses in
bewußte Anwendung der Naturwissenschaft, Mechanik, Chemie etc., für
bestimmte Zwecke)”.8 Technologie, then, is not only knowledge related to
innovation made up of machines, i.e. knowledge of the way in
which science enters directly into the production process, but it is
also, at the same time, study and knowledge, in its naturalisticobjectivistic perspective, of the movements of the workforce. In
other words, for Marx, the machine is intended simultaneously as a specific form
of use of the workforce. Furthermore Technologie is precisely the new
science which, while dealing with the introduction of machines,
takes as object of its knowledge the use of the workforce as an
objective and impersonal performance.

7

K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, Collected Works, 35: 489. [For Moore and Aveling’s original 1887
translation, see Capital Vol. 1, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1967, p. 486 – ed. note.]
8 K. Marx, Ökonomische Manuskripte 1863-1867, MEGA, II, 4, 1: 95 (my translation).
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Modern Technology in the first volume of Capital is therefore
intrinsically connected with the concept of abstract labour, as the
capitalist use and disposition of the labour force in the modern
factory system. It is the science of the machine-force-labour system,
in which the latter is itself machine activity, from which every
possible element of subjectivity and intentionality is absent.
But it is precisely the 1861-63 Manuscripts that is the text in which
Marx first came to a theorization on the machinery that allowed
him to confirm what he had already intuited in drafting the
Grundrisse: namely that the original reality of abstract work, as
substance of value, is placed not in the sphere of exchange and
circulation but in that of the labour process as capitalist use of
labour-power within the machinery system.
At the centre of the initial page of notebook XIX Marx wrote
«Theilung der Arbeit und mechanisches Atelier, Werkzeug und Maschinerie»,
to carry out from there a long discussion that occupies the whole of
Notebook XIX and the first ten pages of Notebook XX. The central
question is that of the metamorphosis of the tool in the machine
and the transition from craftsmanship as a determining factor of
production to work as a subordinate and marginal factor with
respect to the productive force of science. The machine, on this
Marx is very clear, does not arise from the division of labour and
the breakdown of labour operations. This was in fact the path that
Adam Smith had followed, writing in the Wealth of Nations:
I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines by
which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally
owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier
and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their
minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a
great variety of things.9

Instead for Marx, the introduction of the machinery interrupts all
historical continuity with the centrality of an anthropomorphic principle in production in favor of a production process that is autonomous from the knowledge and centrality of the human being.
Already in the Grundrisse he had written that the machine was
born from the specialization of the instruments and their synthesis
9 A. Smith, An inquiry into the nature and cause of the wealth of nations, Elecbook Classics: 23-24.
[Printed version, cf. Ibid., London, Ward, Lock and Tyler, 1910, Ch. 1, p. 23 – ed- note.]
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in an automatism that autonomized itself, through science, from the
shape and limits of the human body. The theory of formal
subsumption and of real subsumption, that Marx has already
developed here, is based precisely on this autonomization of
knowledge deposited in the machine by the knowledge and doing
of the craftsman who in manufacture was one with his instrument.
The autonomization (differentiation) of the system of machines
from the human body implies the radical transformation of the
knowledge involved in the production process. We move from the
competence and experience of the “partial worker”, i.e. of the
Teilarbeiter of manufacturing, to the sciences of nature transformed
into the materiality of the means of labour. As a consequence of
this overcoming of the limits of the human body it is impossible to
deduce the introduction the machine system moving from the
manufacturing division of labour.
It is altogether erroneous to suppose that modern machinery originally
appropriated those operations alone, which division of labour had simplified.
Spinning and weaving were, during the manufacturing period, split up into new
species, and the implements were modified and improved; but the labour itself
was in no way divided, and it retained its handicraft character. It is not the
labour, but the instrument of labour, that serves as the starting-point of the
machine.10

For Marx “this subjective principle of the division of labour no
longer exists in production by machinery”11 and this disappearance
of subjectivity means that work in the new factory system becomes
abstract work, no longer highly individualized and particularized
work like that of the Teilarbeiter of Manufacture, but work reduced
to a purely barren abstraction – a simple property which appears in
unvarying monotony in the same operation and for which the total production
capacity of the worker, the manifoldness of his abilities, is confiscated.12

Application of the natural sciences to production through the
creation of the machinery and transformation of the virtuous and
very particular work of the Teilarbeiter into abstract work: these are
the two deeply connected characteristics for Marx of the factory as
10

K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, Collected Works, 35: 381n. [1967 London edition, cit., p. 378, n.]
Ivi, 382. (1967 London edition, cit., p. 380)
12 K. Marx, MEGA II, 3/1, p.252 (1861-1863 Manuscripts). [English trans. in R. Beamish Marx,
Method and the Division of Labor, Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press 1992, p. 109].
11
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a new production system and as a specific object of the new science
of Technologie.
With respect to this meaning of Technologie, it should be
emphasized that Marx rarely uses the term Technik in Capital and in
the preparatory manuscripts, while he uses the adjective technique
that derives from it more frequently. I think that the term Technik in
the Marxian lexicon refers to a much less structured and much less
historically determined context of meaning. It means the ability of
homo faber, in general, throughout the history of its species, to
intervene on the work object through means and procedures
appropriate to the peculiar characteristics of the work object. That
is the term Technik refers to a production process seen from the
anthropological perspective of the worker-producers and their
skills, acquired through apprenticeship and generational
transmission over time, in order, through tools and means of work,
to make useful an initially useless work material.
In this view in Marx’s texts of Capital, the term “Technik” generally has two meanings: it means, more frequently, either the set of
means of production, that is, the physical set of tools or machinery for
working objects of work, or, with fewer occurrences, the procedures, the skills of an art, that is, the systems of action of an actor
oriented towards a productive end. It is a meaning that in both cases
refers to the degree of development of the productive forces, in
their relationship with nature and work materials, without considering the social relations between the means of work and the workforce.
Think of Marx’s concepts of technische Basis, technische Unterlage,
technische Grundlage or their synonym as technische Bedingung or, again,
technical progress. Think also of the category of the “technical
composition of capital” [technische Zusammensetzung], where the
relationship between the means of production and the workforce is
only physical, quantitative, and does not refer to the qualitative
nature of the relationship.
In short, even if the occurrences of the terms Technologie and
Technik in Marxian texts are not always distinguished precisely, I
believe that it can be said that the two concepts are used by Marx
with reference to the action of two different social actors: Technik
refers to the history of the tools and means of work created and
accumulated by man, as a characteristic of the human species, in its
diversity from other living species, to know how to confront and
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work nature (development and accumulation of productive forces
over time), while Technology refers to a production system through
machines created by science and at the same time under the control
and direction of those who through the monopoly of science
organize the specifically capitalist production process, in which the
producers are themselves, like nature, made the object and
subordinate elements of the work process.
Based on this diversity of meanings between Technik and
Technologie it is legitimate, in my opinion, to theorize an expansion
of the concept of fetishism, even if this formulation is not explicitly
stated in Marx’s text. Fetishism is not only the one explicitly
theorized by Marx in the first book. It is not just that of the
“commodities” that move autonomously themselves, of their own
life, like fetishes. But it is also the fetishism proper to capital, when the
meaning of Technik overlaps that of Technologie, making every
dimension of domination and authoritarianism, every asymmetrical
relationship and power between human beings disappear from the
representation of the production system.
Fetishism means reification, concealment and dissimulation of
the relationships between human beings in the body of things.
Here, more as capital fetishism then commodity fetishism, it means a
process of capital enhancement that disappears in the face of the
objectivity of the work process: it means a process of social
relationships, based on inequality and exploitation, that takes the
form of a process marked by the objectivity and truth of science
and, specifically today, by the creativity and intelligence of the new
knowledge-worker.
We must not forget that the doctrine of fetishism in Marx’s work
is connected with a profound transformation of the concept of
“ideology”. With the Marxian theory of fetishism in Capital, ideology
becomes intrinsic to the economic process. It is generated by the
economic structure itself. It is no longer false consciousness,
implemented by the abstract and fallacious thinking of philosophers
and ideologists. Nor is ideology the production of ideas and images
of the world that takes place within the superstructure, according to
the indication of the 1859 Preface. In Capital, ideology is the
representative counterfeiting that the economic structure produces
by itself, objectively, without the intervention, if not only acquisitive
and passive, of human consciousness.
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4. “Information” against “knowledge”: the last ideology.
It is through this thesis of a structural fetishism, intrinsic to the
production process, and today to be reread as the exchange
between Technologie and Technik, that we can arrive at a critical
analysis of the enormous transformation that we are experiencing
today with the new information technologies applied to the
production of capital. In other words, we can analyze the enormous
mystification that happens through a surface of technical staging that
hides the deeper technologies relationships of exploitation.
From this point of view I believe that, in the world of postFordism, the most widespread contemporary ideology is that of
seeing new technologies as linked to the development of an
intelligence and knowledge, both individual and collective, ever
wider and always freer from slavery and repetition of Fordist
manual work. The new ideology concerns the new information
technologies conceived as techniques capable of putting an end to
the anthropological era of labour as effort and initiating the new
historical era of a work based on knowledge, and therefore
characterized by the enhancement of the most creative and logicaldiscursive faculties of the human mind. It is the ideology of the easy
establishment, through the fielding of new mental work with
computer machines, of a collective subjectivity which, freed from
the differences and heaviness of bodies, works an essentially
common alpha-numeric language.
In my opinion, the core of this new ideology, linked to new
technologies, consists in confusing human knowledge with the
transmission and processing of information. It is, namely, an ideology
which confuses the construction of knowledge as interpretation, as
solving problems and clarifying with meanings the intricate and
troubled spheres of life, with the communication and calculation of
information through automatic procedures by systems of signs.
In order to better explain the difference between knowledge and
information that I intend to propose to your attention, it is very
useful, in my opinion, to refer to the conception of the cognitive
process theorized in Spinoza’s Ethics. In the second book of his
more important work Spinoza writes:
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other
words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else»
(Spinoza, Ethics, II, prop. XIII).
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And he adds in proposition XXIII:
The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of
the modifications of the body.

This means that for Spinoza the human mind first thinks of its own
body, assumes it as a privileged object and content. But the JewishDutch thinker also emphasizes that the body itself is an individual
formed by many individuals:
The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of diverse
nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex (Ethics, II, Prop. XIII,
postulate I).

The human body is a “society” made up of many parts and
functions. The human mind takes care of this manifold organism
by ensuring with its thought activity, as far as possible, to feed the
plurality of the body with a variegated multiplicity of sources of
energy and life present in the external world. The truth of
knowledge, of the activity of the mind, lies in the degree of intensity
that manages to ensure the body’s effort to maintain itself and to
develop its life force, and it also lies in the degree of vital
solicitation that is able to assure for all the components of his body.
As is known, Spinoza defines the condition of maximum intensity
of life of the body with the Latin term: laetitia. While defining the
opposite condition of low vital activity of the various components
of the body: tristitia. All this leads us to say that in Spinoza the logical
value of knowing depends on the biological value of the «conatus».
The maintenance and reproduction of the body organism, with the
emotional feeling that accompanies them, is therefore the place of
the origin of meaning: origin of the value, what distinguishes good from
evil, laetitia from tristitia.
In this perspective the act of knowing (from language to the
highest conceptual functions), is the activity of the mind that does
not create meaning, but safeguards it, protects it and brings it to light:
because it is able to bind the internal world of the body with the
external world, allowing the body to practise the full set of
relationships best suited to its life needs.
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For all this Spinoza’s Ethics looms large in the history of modern
philosophy, because it has profoundly connected body paths and
thought paths, and because he was the first in the history of Western
culture to propose a materialistic-corporeal conception of the distinction
between good and evil. According to Spinoza, in fact, that fundamental
distinction does not arise from knowing but from feeling.
An intellectualistic ethic presupposes that good and evil are
external objects, belonging to a tradition or an objective structure
of reality. Whereas the Ethics of Spinoza considers good what
increases the power of life of the emotional body of the human
being and produces the feeling of “laetitia”: whereas it considers evil
what diminishes and saddens that same power of life, generating
the feeling of “tristitia”. This kind of passage from an intellectualistic
ethics of knowledge to a materialistic ethics of feeling is still fundamental
today, in my opinion, to understand the depth of the
interpenetration of mind and body in human experience and to
understand how much emotions, instead of abstract reason, can be
a source of knowledge.
Over the past few decades, contemporary psychologists,
psychoanalysts and neurobiologists have referred to this conception
of Spinoza. Some of them have developed a so-called “two-axis
anthropology”, according to which the existence of the human
being must be conceived as the organization of two constitutive
axes. On the one hand the vertical axis, as the structure of all
possible relationships between mind and body, between thought
and emotional dynamics and on the other the horizontal axis as the
structure of all possible relationships between that body / mind and
the other external minds or external environment.
The nature of these two axes is deeply heterogeneous. Their
characteristics, their way of proceeding, are different. Nevertheless
according to these scholars it is fundamental to focus on their intertwining, following Spinoza’s lesson, to access a deeply materialistic
conception of life and in particular of human knowledge. The
basic thesis of these scholars is in fact that the more the mind
expands its external field and horizon of knowledge, the more it
accesses a rich and deep drive dynamic on the vertical plane, and
vice versa.
In biological terms this means that knowledge of the external
world finds its original meaning in the way in which the unity of a
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biological-emotional organism, such as the human body, pre-intents
the environment, anticipating and promoting the purpose of its
reproduction. Therefore even the most abstract and elaborate
human knowledge finds its original and remote but no less present
meaning (without falling into easy reductionisms) in the bodyemotional system. It is always an organism, as a unity, that acts and
moves, that attributes meaning to an incoming signal or
perturbation.
But the peculiarity of the human brain is that of being able to fix,
through abstraction and generalization, invariants, general concepts
or general modalities of meaning and behaviour that can be used
not only once, in a single context, but several times, by several
people, in different and variable contexts. These invariants of
knowledge, these formations of universal and generalized use,
constitute information properly so called, the codification of which
allows the accumulation and transmission of any fundamental
cultural heritage for the reproduction of individual societies as for
the history of humanity as a whole.
As is evident the choice and type of identification and
communication of information codes – what signs to use, what the
rules of their combination, what their grammars and syntax are –
has profoundly marked the evolution of human history. In this
sense we must recognize, that the greatest transformations in the
history of human civilization have always been accompanied by
profound revolutions in terms of the techniques of
communication. In a very schematic way, it can be indeed
summarized, as follows:
1. The invention of the alphabet made it possible to synthesize
the entire field of communication, both oral and written, in just
25/30 signs, allowing humanity to get out of an iconographic communication, the use of which remained in the hands of few. In this
way the alphabet represented the fundamental means of passage
from a society based on an aristocratic-priestly culture to a society
of culture potentially accessible to great masses of the population.
2. Many centuries later the other major step in the field of
communication technique was certainly represented by the
invention of printing and the abandonment of the amanuensis
technique, with the enormous diffusion of the book and the written
document that followed.
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3. Today we are undoubtedly experiencing the third great
revolution with computers, capable of transmitting and processing
an enormous quantity of signs condensed in a small silicon unit13.
5. The world as a «massive information process»
However we must not forget what level of abstraction has been
reached today by the mathematical coding that underlies the
different computer languages. The modern invention of machines
for transmission and processing of information, independently of
meaning, as strings of dots and lines in Morse alphabet, 0s and 1s in
today’s computers, has fully detached information from any
concrete and empirical meaning. The enormous power to accumulate,
process and transmit information today is founded on the possibility of
translating the alphabetical code into numerical-mathematical code and in turn
of translating the numerical-mathematical code into electronic signs, into energy
differentials. In this way the transmission and elaboration of
information has become a mathematical science and information
could be formally analyzed, elaborated and transmitted, independently of any interpretation.
The revolution of new technologies offers today, but even more
in the future, an enormous possibility that the mankind may enter
into communication with itself, reach a self-awareness of itself,
precisely through the enormous ability to store and process
information. However we must not forget that this enormous
acceleration of information processing is based on a logic of
moving signs according to formal rules prescribing how to write
and re-write them. At the heart of computability, of computational
approaches of the notion of information, lies the powerful
promotion of meaningless formalismus as information carriers.
In the context of this technological revolution, contemporary
ideology consists, as I have said, in seeing the world as «a massive
information process», in which human intelligence itself is
considered as a computational machine that processes information
and which can be replaced by artificial intelligence, through
machines which can process a huge amount of signs.
On the contrary I believe that it is necessary to maintain the
profound difference between “sign” and “symbol”, with the
13 On this topic see the excellent book by Clarisse Herrenschmidt, Le trois écritures: langue,
nombre, code, Gallimard, Paris 2007.
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distinction between syntax and semantics that this entails. In fact, a
system of signs follows the formal rules of connection /disjunction,
which constitute its grammar, for example those of a binary code
with their respect for the principle of non-contradiction. These
formal rules of movement of the signs are in fact “formal”, because
they form a syntax that is independent of meaning. Indeed alphabetical
signs and numbers do not exist in nature. On the contrary the symbol,
from the perspective of the human sciences, is a sign that refers to a
meaning, to a semantics, which actually directs our life, separating
the good from the evil, and thus building intentions and the
prospects of our agency in the world.14
I would say that the meaning of the signs as symbols is therefore
what constitutes the content, not reducible to the language of our life, not
reducible to any code, and which has its roots in the body of our
memory and our feelings. Because it is by our memory and our
feelings that we gradually build the perspectives, according to which
we give organization and form to the world we are living in:
precisely through an emotional memory that selects the important
invariants in our experience and discards what is outside our vital
interest.
This means, in a materialistic perspective, that knowledge is
generated in the human being only when knowledge is deeply
connected with feeling: a complex of feelings that give meaning to
and direct our exchange, our “agency”, with respect to our
biological and social environment. In the human being there is an
indispensability of the body, physical and emotional, in building
meaningful knowledge. As Giuseppe Longo states, the human
brain, like the animal brain, forms information in the sense of
knowledge through a way that is completely different from the way
in which that same information will then be processed and
formalized in the binary languages of the digital computer.15
14 The deeper reflections on this topic can be found, in my opinion, in G. Longo, Information at
the Threshold of Interpretation Science as Human Construction of Sense, in A Critical Reflection on
Automated Science - Will Science Remain Human?, Bertolaso M. and Sterpetti F. (eds), Cham (CH),
Springer 2020, pp. 67-100. For a more in-depth knowledge of Giuseppe Longo’s extensive
work see: http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo.
15 G. Longo, Information at the Threshold of Interpretation Science as Human Construction of Sense,
particularly p. 87 and following. But see also by the same author, Quantifying the World and its
Webs:
Mathematical
Discrete
vs
Continua
in
Knowledge
Construction,
https://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo/files//letter-to-Turing.pdf.
DOI:10.1177/0263276419840414.
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But against a materialistic vision of the human being, based on
the interaction of the two axes, vertical and horizontal, the
exchange of knowledge with information and with computational
approaches to information, an identity of human subjectivity is
developing built only on a horizontal axis of identity and relationship, to the detriment of the development of the vertical axis.
This anthropology of the horizontal, due to the removal of the vertical
dimension, makes impossible any critical distance from which
individual and collective life processes can be evaluated and
directed. It represents in fact the diffusion over the entire social
body of a managerial behaviour, as a way of acting in a world
connected, organized through the network, in a horizontalrhizomatic world, where the primary competence consists in the
ability to enter into relationship and to build bonds.
It is the production of a horizontal mind, as a typology of diffuse and
mass mind, which therefore today is on the agenda as a
fundamental anthropological function for the production and
valorization of capital.
The myth of contemporary society of being a society of
knowledge and creative participation of all in the world understood
as a massive information process is central to this process.
This ideology, based on the exchange between knowledge and
information, once again plays the appearance and surface of a
concrete work that hides the reality of an abstract work.
It is said that new information technologies need increasingly
communicative work performance and therefore a subject capable
of interacting with his working environment through all his
intelligence and mental skills, his autonomous ability to choose.
According to this vision, in the flexible economy of post-Fordism
the contexts of production and the market, because of the network
organization that characterizes them, are increasingly complex and
differentiated. In relation to this it is necessary to make full use of
the complexity and elasticity of the human mind. Therefore today
we need a performance with strong subjective participation and a
degree of individualization that would refute the Marxian discourse
on abstract labour, which can now only refer to the past for
nineteenth-century and twentieth-century capitalism. According to
this vision, with post-Fordist and post-industrial society, the
effectiveness of work and concrete knowledge, the need for
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personalized intervention, with respect to standardized models of
behaviour, would have been extended to a very large extent.
In my opinion the verisimilitude of this discourse reflects only a
surface reality, which in hindsight should be reversed. It seems to
me that today it is the alpha-numeric language of computer
machines that, with its binary codes – that is, codes that are simple
and highly formalized – commands human intelligence. It is the
computer language deposited in data processing programs that
requires an environment that is already simplified and capable of
being processed by the computer, which requires an environment
with a very low degree of unpredictability. Nor is it a coincidence
that the most efficient artificial intelligence systems are those that
operate within very simplified work environments and are
homologated to the limits of their calculation procedures.
I mean, in short, that the problem of new technologies today is
not so much that they, in the near future, would put an end to
human work, with the threat of integrally replacing the human mind
with automation and artificial intelligence. It is instead that of a
reduction/conformation of the world-environment, including
workers of the mind, according to parameters mainly of
simplification and quantitative measurement, suitable for
constituting the massive information process database. The real
problem is that of a superficialization of the world reduced to
measurement fields and only quantitative evaluation, which exclude
value-oriented criteria and parameters. That is, to use Max Weber's
sociological language, criteria that are valid for acting, determined
for purpose and not for value-oriented action, able to discuss,
compare and choose between purposes.
In fact, the intelligence required by information technologies is
an intelligence that can certainly operate and choose between
several variables, but using programs that already in some way
predetermine and force the field of possible answers. That is to say
that the field of action of the intellectual worker can be
incomparably more varied and polysemic than that of the ancient
manual worker, but at the same time that same field is structured
according to syntax and work sheets which, however many, refer to
a semantics, a choice that is articulable and innovative meanings
and aims within a given horizon. Even in this sense of a historically
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given and unachievable horizon we can say that flexible and global
capitalism increasingly needs a horizontal mind.
In conclusion I believe that it can be affirmed that if in Fordism
the Maschinerei-Arbeitskraft system required the use of a mindless body,
today the post-Fordist capitalist economy, in its most advanced
places of development, requires a mind without a body. A mind that
must be anaffective and decorporated and in which there is
knowledge without self-recognition: that is acquisition and processing of
information without recognition of the meaning and emotional
value (and therefore of the ethical-political value) of their contents.
For this reason, the social and cultural movements, today critical
of capitalism, cannot in my opinion avoid deepening the breadth of
their social criticism and attempting, against the computerdominated knowledge society, to intertwine and strengthen, with
each other, the critique of political economy and the critique of the libidinal
economy.
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